Mary Ireta Crofts v. Josiah Hoyt Crofts : Plaintiff\u27s Petition For Rehearing and Brief In Support Thereof by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1968
Mary Ireta Crofts v. Josiah Hoyt Crofts : Plaintiff 's
Petition For Rehearing and Brief In Support
Thereof
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Olsen & Chamberlain; Attorneys for RespondentMattson &
Jackson and Gustin & Richards; Attorneys for Appellant
This Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Petition for Rehearing, Crofts v. Crofts, No. 11165 (Utah Supreme Court, 1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/99
-J. 
'.f 
IN TH'.E SUPREME C01URl 
I \ ' , ' 
' I/ I 
\ ,,: 
\I• 
''of ·the. 
' ',~ . 
. / 
I.'. 
'~· , ' '1 \ l ', 
STATE 10F. Ul'Aft 
. ' .' I ' I \ r· 
:j I\ :I'• 
11,.1)1'1' 
,_. ,'• 
1, 
r \ 1 I 
I ;1' 
I 
i 
' ,f ~ { 
, . i·,r 
' 1 '. ' ~ 1·-1 _n. I, . 
'I I 'fd «_, :; 
j" ' ' - .ff./ . ~ ~ 
_' :. i ;• \ '/".• '' \/.__: '( 'I J I 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
l'ABLE OF COWfEN'l'N 
Page 
PETITION FOR REHEARING __ _ _ _ ____ _ __ ______ _ __ 1 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ·--··--------- ________________________ ,._______ 2 
ARGUMENT ------------------ 3 
POINT I. 
THIS COURT OBVIOUSLY AND COMPLETELY IG-
NORED THE RECORD ON APPEAL AND THE 
ADMISSION AND EXPRESS ORAL STIPULATION 
OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT IN CONNE~ 
TION WITH POINT III SET FORTH IN PLAIN-
TIFF'S ORIGINAL BRIEF HEREIN RELATING TO 
THE INCORRECT AND UN SUPPORT ABLE AL-
LOWANCE OF $350.00 AND $1271.14 AS CREDITS 
ON THE AMOUNT AWARDED PLAINTIFF AS A 
SETTLEMENT OF HER RIGHTS IN DEFEND-
ANT'S PROPERTY. ___ -· _ ___ __ _______ _ _____ ____________ 3 
POINT II. 
THIS COURT HAS CITED IN SUPPORT OF ITS 
REFUSAL TO DIRECT THE ENTRY OF A PROPER 
AND CORRECT DECLARATORY J U D GM E NT 
HEREIN WITH RESPECT TO "EQUITIES" IN THE 
PANGUITCH HOME A COMPLETELY INAPPLIC-
ABLE UTAH STATUTE AND HAS IGNORED CON-
TROLLING AND APPLICABLE STATUTES. _______________ ~l 
POINT III. 
THIS COURT HAS MISSTATED AND ENTIRELY 
MISCONSTRUED THE DECREE OF THE LOWER 
COURT WITH RESPECT TO SOURCES OF PAY-
MENT OF THE $10,000.00 THAT PLAINTIFF WAS 
AWARDED BY THE DIVORCE DECREE AND AS 
A RESULT HAS APPROVED INCORRECTLY AND 
WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION THE INADEQUATE 
AND INCOMPLETE ACCOUNTING SUBMITTED 
BY DEFENDANT. _________ ---------------- -----------------------·--------··---·- 14 
CONCLUSION ------ -- ------------- ---------------·---------------------------- -------· 16 
APPENDIX (TRANSCRIPT OF EXCERPTS FROM 
ORAL ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL BEFORE 
UT AH SUPREME COURT) ---- --------------------·-----------·---------· 19 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
lNDl~X OF l'ANI<.:N CITED 
Cole v. Cole (1942), 101 Utah 355, 122 P. 2d 201 
Stieler v. Stieln· (l\linn. 1955), 70 N.W. 2d 127 
Al T'l'H OHl 'I' lEN (_'J 'l'ED 
26 Am. Jur. 665-6 
26 Am. Jur. 681 . 
12 Am. Jur. 570 .. .... ... ..... . .. 
12 Am. Jur. 573 . 
Anderson's Declarato1·y Judgmt>nts, p. 600, para. 202 
N'l'A'l'U'J'EiS Cl'l'ED 
Utah Cude Annotated 1953, St>ction 78-32-2 . 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-33-1 . 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-33-5 . 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 78-:3:3-12 . 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, Section 30-3-5 
Page 
7 
11, 14 
7 
7 
8 
~ 
11 
~ 
. .. 10 
111 
. ......... 111 
13 
U'l'AH CONN'l'l'l'll'l'JON PHO\'l~JON CJ'J'ED 
ARTICLE XXII, Section 2 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
ST ATE OF UTAH 
.\IAJ{Y I HWl'A CROJ;'Tt-l. \ 
Plaintiff and Ap11ellr111t) 
vs. No. 11 ]f)fi 
.J08IAH HOY'l' CROFTS. \ 
De.fendant and Rcspu11dnd.} 
P~Tl'l'lON J;'OR lU~HJ<}AHJNU 
Mary Ireta Crofts, the plaintiff and appPllant 111 
the above-entitled case, respectfully petitions the court 
for a hearing of said casl' upon thP following gronndf' 
and for the following reasons: 
I. This court obviously and eompletel:• ignored the 
record on appeal and the admission and express oral 
stipulation of counsel for defendant in connection with 
Point III set forth in plaintiff's original brief herein 
relating to the incorrect and ummpportable allowance 
of $350.00 and $1271.14 as credits on the amount awarded 
plaintiff as a settlement of her rights in de.f c11da11(s 
property. 
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IL This court has cited in support of its refm;al 
to direct the entry of a proper and correct Declaratory 
Judgment herein with respect to "equities" in the Pan-
guitch home a completely inapplicable Utah Statute and 
has ignored controlling and applicable Statutes. 
III. This court has misstated and entirely miscon-
strued the decree of the lower court with respect to 
sources of payment of the $10,000.00 plaintiff was 
awarded by the divorce decree and as a result has 
approved incorrectly and without justification the inade-
quate and incomplete accounting submitted by defendant. 
MATrl'RNON, .JACKSON & 
McIFF 
GUSTIN & RICHARDS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The facts in this case have been stated quite fully 
in plaintiff's original Brief filed herein. However, in 
view of the fact that this court has misstated and mis-
construed some of the facts involved, we will make fur-
ther reference thereto in the following argument. 
Emphasis and italics throughout this Brief are ours, 
unless indicated otherwise. 
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ARGUMENrl' 
POINT I. 
THIS COURT OBVIOUSLY AND COMPLETELY IG-
NORED THE RECORD ON APPEAL AND THE 
ADMISSION AND EXPRESS ORAL STIPULATION 
OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT IN CONNECTION 
WITH POINT III SET FORTH IN PLAINTIFF'S 
ORIGINAL BRIEF HEREIN RELATING TO THE 
INCORRECT AND UNSUPPORTABLE ALLOW-
ANCE OF $350.00 AND $1271.14 AS CREDITS ON 
THE AMOUNT AWARDED PLAINTIFF AS A SET-
TLEMENT OF HER RIGHTS IN DEFENDANT'S 
PROPERTY. 
Two sums allowed by the lower court as credits on 
the $10,000.00 amount awarded to plaintiff by the divorce 
decree were $350.00 and $1271.14 representing one-half 
of the amounts realized by the parties from the sale by 
them of a Panguitch pasture and a Salt Lake City home, 
respectively, held and owned by them as joint tenants. 
There is no justification for either of these allowances, 
both of which were allowed by this court when it did 
not disturb the lower court's findings on the accounting. 
These amounts represent plaintiff's one-half of the 
net sale proceeds from the sale of two properties, both 
owned by the parties as joint tenants. When they were 
sold, the plaintiff was entitled to one-half of the net 
sale proceeds because she owned that one-half. How 
defendant could be granted credit for either of these 
amounts is beyond our comprehension. In effect, the 
two courts have ruled that plaintiff is required to pay 
herself out of her own money. The decree of divorce 
~tates that she is awarded the $10,000.00 "as a perma-
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nent, complete and final settlement of her rights iu the 
11ro1Jcrfy of the Dcfcl/(la1d ... ·· but thv lowt•r eomt alHI 
this Conrt ha:-; How said that sh<' i:-; n·qnin·d to appl~- JM 
own pro pPrt~, 011 the $10,000.00. 
The matter is so clear with respect to the $350.00 
amount that counsel for defendant conceded the point 
in oral argument before this court when he said: 
"Now with respect to the $350.00 on the pas-
ture I assume - I assume that - being as Mrs. 
Crofts did have horses which were her own prop-
erty - race horses - I assume that possibly the 
$:150.00 should not han· heP11 a eredit, and wP'll 
stipulate to that." (Appendi.x p. i.) 
In order to remove any possible uncertainty as to 
tht· effect of the sti1mlation of eounsel for defrndant, 
(·oum;el for plaintiff then said in oral argmuent lwforP 
this court: 
"Now I understand that Mr. Chamberlain ha~ 
said here today, which hasn't been admitted pre-
viously, that he will stipulate now that the $350.00 
should not have been a credit, realized from the 
sale of the Panguitch pasture which was owned 
jointly by the parties, and he will also stipulate 
that the equities will be determined when the 
Panguitch home is sold ... " (Appendix p. i) 
Counsel for defendant did not disagree with this stale· 
ment of this stipulation on either point, but nevertheles~ 
this court proceeded to allow credit for the $350.00 and 
refused to determine when (or how) equities in the 
Panguitch home would be determined. 
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With respect to the $1271.14 claimed by defendant 
and allowed by the court as a credit on the $10,000.00 
amount awarded plaintiff, there is no stipulation by 
eounsel for defendant that this was an improper credit. 
'l'he evidence was contradictory as to whether or not the 
partiPs agreed this should be a credit, but as a matter 
of law we submit that the allowance of this sum as a 
credit is not supportable or permitted. Once again, if 
it is allowed as such credit, plaintiff is being made to 
pay from her own funds and property amounts due her 
by and from defendant out of his property. On the 
factual side, counsel for defendant misstated the record 
in oral argument before this court in saying: 
"They came to Salt Lake City and rather 
than rent here they assumed the contract on a 
home. This again is in the record. They assumed 
the contract on a home and when they left Salt 
Lake City in 1956 they sold that contract to a 
third party." (Appendix p. i) 
We challenge counsel for defendant to find in the record 
one single word about assuming a contract on a home in 
Salt Lake City and selling that contract to a third party. 
There was no such testimony. The truth is that the rec-
ord shows that the parties bought a home in Salt Lake 
City and it was conveyed to them as joint tenants, from 
which it would follow that Mrs. Crofts owned the entire 
estate for purposes of tenure and survivorship and a 
one-half interest for purposes of alienation. (R. 178-9, 
258-9, 260, 302.) When they sold that home, each was 
entitled in his or her own right to one-half of the net 
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lJl'Oceeds. When plaintiff received $1271.14 representing 
her one-half interest IN THA '11 HOME (defendant also 
rt>ceived and retained $1271.14 for his one-half interest) 
~h;c was receiving her own property. She was not recen-
ing property of the defendant or a payment by defe11da11t 
from or out of his property. In effect, the court has said 
to plaintiff: "You are required to pay this $1271.14 to 
yourself out of your own property, and we are going to 
allow defendant credit for that sum on what he owes you 
out of his property." This is not what the divorce decreP 
provides and this is not the law. 
Furthermore, there was absolutely no consideration 
for any understanding, whatever it was and regardless 
of whether the lower court believed the plaintiff or the 
defendant as to the application of this $1271.14 as a 
credit on the $10,000.00. Defendant testified that tht 
total paid for the parties' equity in the Salt Lake home 
was paid in two checks, each made payable to both of 
the parties, and that they endorsed "each other's check 
at that time. It was made in two checks, one for her 
and one for me." (R. 254). Plaintiff has now been re-
quired to pay to herself for the credit of the defendant 
th13 $1271.14 represented by "her" check. If the salr 
proceeds did not belong to both plaintiff and defendant. 
why were the checks made payable to both of tlwm and 
whv did they includP her as a payee? 
The divorce decreP did nut award to <kfendant tlw 
plaintiff's one-half interest in these properties. It did 
not even mention these properties, but the court has 
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/ 
now tahn thl'lll frorn lwr. Tt awarded plaintiff $10,000.00 
in settlement "of her inter<:>sts in the property of the de-
fendant." The court has taken from plaintiff a Constitu-
tional right: 
ARTICLE XXII, Section 2 of the Constitu-
tion of Utah reads as follows: 
"Real and personal property of every female 
acquired before marriage, and all property t~ 
which she may afterwards become entitled by 
purchase, gift, grant, inheritance or devise, shall 
be and remain the estate and property of such 
female, and shall not be liable for the debts, obli-
gations or engagements of her husband, and may 
be conveyed, devised or bequeathed by her as if 
she were unmarried." 
Despite this, the court has now required plaintiff to use 
her property to pay the debt of the defendant. 
26 Am. Jur. 665-6 and 681 clearly states that a mar-
ried woman's property includes the proceeds of a sale 
thereof. The Cole v. Cole case (1942) 101 Utah 355, 122 
P2d 201) cited by counsel for both parties refers to 
certain property owned as community property by hus-
band and wife, and points out that since it was not men-
tioned in the decree, findings or conclusions." ... the 
decree could have no effect on the holding or ownership 
of the stock. ... " 
Even if the court believes defendant's testimony as 
opposed to that of plaintiff as to the claimed agreement 
that the $1271.14 (and this would also apply to the $350.-
00) was to be a credit on the $10,000.00, there was no 
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<'onsideration to SU]J]Jort any such agreement. It is fun-
damental and elementary law that there must be a benefit 
to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee. 12 
Am. Jur. 570, Sec. 79. What benefit was there to Mr~. 
Crofts and what detrimrnt was therv to Mr. Crofts for 
an.'- agreernent snd1 as that claimed by .illr. Crofts to tlw 
<'ffect that Mrs. Crofts would allow these amounts she 
alread.'· owned and was entitled to as a credit on thP 
amount Mr. Crofts already owed to her. rrhe answer 
is ohvions. 'l'ht>re must be some right, interest, profits or 
bem•fi t accruing to .l'ilr:-;. Cr of ts or some forbearance, 
dl'triment, loss, or responsibility gi\'en, suffered or nn-
dPrtaken by Mr. Crofts. Here, there was neither. As 
stated in 12 Am. Jur. 57;3 referred to above: 
"' ... Any benefit conferred or agr('e<l to be 
l'onf erred upon the promisor (Mrs. Crofts) by 
an.'· other person to which the lJromisor is not 
lawfully entitled, or any prejudice suffered or 
agreed to be suffered by such person (Mr. Crofts) 
other than such as he is at the time of consent 
lawfully bound to suffer, as an inducement to the 
promisor, is a sufficient consideration for ~he 
JJI'Ornise ... •Benefit' as used in this connect10.n 
means that the promisor has, in return for his 
promise, acquired some legal right to which h.P 
-would not otherwise have been entitled; "detn-
mPnt' means that the prornisee has, in return for 
the promise, forborne sonH_' legal right which. he 
would otherwise have been ('ntitled to exercise. 
" 
J 11 our <.'as<', the promise<' (Mr. Crofts) did not forego 
nnY advantage or henefit or part with a right he might 
otl.ierwis<' exert. He gan up nothing when Mrs. Crofts 
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n·<·<'i n~d tlw prort><'ds from tlw sale of her ow11 property. 
She received no benefit when she merely received that 
which she was already entitled to receive. 
POINT II. 
THIS COURT HAS CITED IN SUPPORT OF ITS 
REFUSAL TO DIRECT THE ENTRY OF A PROPER 
AND CORRECT DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
HEREIN WITH RESPECT TO "EQUITIES" IN THE 
PANGUITCH HOME A COMPLETELY INAPPLI-
CABLE UTAH STATUTE AND HAS IGNORED CON-
TROLLING AND APPLICABLE STATUTES. 
In its opinion, this court has held that there cannot 
be a declaratory judgment upon a judgment and then 
proceeds to cite in support thereof two Utah Statutes. 
Keitht>r one is applicable. Instead, the matter is con-
trolled by other statutory sections not cited by the court: 
This court states that "it is not included within the 
tPrn1s of the statute permitting declaratory judgments" 
and then cites Section 78-32-2, U.C.A. 1953, which reads 
as follows: 
"Any person interested under a deed, will or 
u:ritten contract, or whose rights, status or other 
legal relations are affected by a statute, munici-
pal ordinance, contract or franchi:;c, may havl' 
determined any question of construction or valid-
ity arising under the instrument, statute, ordi-
nance contract or franchise and obtained a dec-
larati~n of rights, status or other legal relations 
thereunder." (Emphasis added - by the court.) 
The quoted section does not have even the most 
remote connection with the matter before this court. It 
is clearly inapplicable. Instead, the matter is controlled 
by the following applicable statutes: 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
, "78-33-1. Jurisdictiu11 of district crJurls _ 
I' 0~·111 - Effect: -_- 'l'he district eourts withi
11 
theu re::; 1Wd1ve JUn::;dictions shal I ha Ye power to 
declare rt(Jhts, status, and other legal relations. 
whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. 
No actw11 or proceedings shall be ope11 to obj11. 
tw11 01t th'.' ground that a declarator:IJ judgmc 11 t 
ur decree is L!(({Jfr'd for. Tht> dP('laration may hr· 
<·ither affirmative or rn_.gative i11 form and effect: 
and snch declarations shall havP the force and 
<>ffect of a final judgrnPnt or dt>cre<'." ( I~mJJha~i.' 
ours.) 
''78-33-5. Hnumeration i11 1Jreccdi11g scct/011.1 
no restriction on court's .rJl'ncral powers - Tlw 
<'numeration in NPdions 7S-:38-:2, 7S-:3:-l-3 and 7~-
33-4 does not limit or restrict the exercise of thl' 
qeneral zw wcrs conf errcd i 11 S cct io 11 78-:)3-1 in an~ 
proceeding where declaratory rl'lief is sought, in 
which a jndgrnent or decree will terminate the con-
troversy or remove the nncPrtaint!·· '' (Em pha8i~ 
ours.) 
"78-33-12. Chapter to be liberally construed. 
-This chapter is declared to be remedial; its pur-
pose is to settle and to afford n•lief from uncer-
tainty and insecurity with respect to rights, statnc 
and other legal relations, and is to be liheral11 
construed and administered." 
In the light of these three applicabl<· statntvs, which 
vrnong other things make it more than clear that Section 
78-33-2, cited by the court in its opinion and which obvi-
onsl!T does not apply in any event because WP are not 
concerm·d with any of the documents Hwntioned therein. 
does not limit or. restrict the power and duty of the 
court to dedare rights of the parties with resprct to 
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11 
"<«jltities in the Panguitch home and to knninate tht> 
1·untrowrs~· and removp the uncertainty with respect 
tlll'reto, we feel that this court will not want its original 
11pinion herein to stand. The statutes are so clear that 
no citation of authority appears to be necessary, but wt> 
do rdt>r the court to Stifler v. Stieler (Minn.) 70 N.W. 
~d 127, a 1955 decision which holds that in a divorce 
case a part~- may move the court for an interpretation 
and clarification of the judgml'nt where it is ambiguous 
(Jr uncertain in its terms or is of doubtful meaning or 
ll!H:'n to diverse constructions, and Anderson's Declara-
ton; Jurlqmcuts, page 600, paragraph 202 states as fol-
lows: 
"A declarator~- j udg1m•n t action will lie to 
eonstrue and determine the meaning of a judg-
ment rendered where the same is indefinite or 
uncertain, and a construction thereof is necessary 
for the stabilizing of the rights, liabilities and 
IPgal relations of the parties." 
\\-P \rnuldn't bl' before this court if the decree in this 
<·asl' <lid not n'4nirl' construction. By a further admis-
~ion made in oral argument before the court (Appendix 
p. ii) eounsel for defendant has now conceded that 
"<·quitit>s" are to be determined when the home is sold -
~0111pthing ht> and his client had not conceded previously 
and which is not part of the determination of the lower 
r·omt in its declaratory judgment herein - and that 
"equities" will then be determined by deducting the bal-
ance then remaining due on the note and mortgage on 
th<· home - something again not conceded previously 
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I:..' 
and which again is not part of the declaratory judgmen' 
herein. We sought a determination of this point ana 
have been denied it. Because defendant was ordered u 
pay all of the dc!Jts. i11cl1uli11g the 11wrtgu9c 011 the farni/,, 
home at Panguitch, we argued before the lower court ann 
on appeal that only costs of sale were to be deducted 
in determining "equities" when the home was sold bu1 
that another possible interpretation was that "equities' 
should be determined by deducting from gross sale pro 
eeeds the costs of sale and the balance remaining due 
I•\•deratPd ~ecurity lrnmrance Company at the ti111t oi 
.jale, this being the only mortgage on the home when 
the decree was entered. Defendant in his accounting 
(R. 91, 92) introduced another "debt" which he clai.me<l 
was an "encumbrance" on the home, but which obviously 
is not the case because all it consisted of was a promis· 
sory note signed by plaintiff and defendant to defend· 
ant's partnership, J. E. Crofts & Sons, and was there· 
fore merely a "debt" he was ordered to pay under the 
terms of the divorce decree. Recognizing the weakness 
of this contention, counsel for defendant apparently has 
conceded in oral argument before this court that de· 
fendant 111nst keep up tlH· pa_nm·nts on the home accord· 
ing to the terms of the one note and mortgage thereon 
which existed when the divorce decree was entered and 
that "equities" will be determined when the home is sold 
by deducting from gross sale proceeds the expenses of 
sale and the balance then remaining due on the one and 
only mortgage debt (to Federated) at that time. The 
minimum we are entitled to is a declaratory judgment 
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to that effect, although we urge that the court is in 
,•rror in not requiring defendant to pay the entire mort-
gage debt before determining equities. The divorce de-
cree, in its uncertain and unsatisfactory language, re-
15nlted in differing constructions. The purpose of the 
Declaratory Judgments Act is to remove that uncer-
tainty. We are not asking for a determination of what 
the "equities" will be when the home is sold. That can-
not be determined until it is sold, but we are entitled to 
!mow the formula and the method of determining "equi-
ties" at that time, which items should be resolved now 
by this court in making an interpretation of the language 
of the divorce decree. 
The next statute cited by the court in its opm10n 
herein is Section 30-3-5, U.C.A. 1953. In support of its 
statement that the finality of judgments must be re-
spected, the court quotes the following part of said 
Section: 
'' ... Such subsequent changes or new orders 
may be made by the court with respect to the 
disposal of the children or the distribution of 
property as shall be reasonable and proper." 
Here again, the statute quoted by the court is inappli-
cable. We are not attacking the finality of the judgment. 
Since a dispute has arisen as to the construction of the 
divorce decree, we are asking what it means. That is 
why we have a Declaratory Judgments Act. The lower 
court, under the guise of interpreting the decree and in 
defining "equities," modified and amended the decree by 
changing "note and mortgage" (one only) to "indebted-
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nesses" - whatever that may mean - and did not ever. 
determine when "equities" were to be determined. ,~ 
determination of that question now will accomplis~ 
exactly what the Declaratory Judgments statutes abow 
y_uoted expressly declare to be their purpose. As statei 
in Stieler v. Stieler, supra. 
POINT III. 
THIS COURT HAS MISSTATED AND ENTIRELY 
MISCONSTRUED THE DECREE OF THE LOWER 
COURT WITH RESPECT TO SOURCES OF PAY· 
MENT OF THE $10,000.00 P LA I NT I F F WAS 
AWARDED BY THE DIVORCE DECREE AND AS 
A RESULT HAS APPROVED INCORRECTLY AND 
WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION THE INADEQUATE 
AND INCOMPLETE ACCOUNTING SUBMITTED BY 
DEFENDANT. 
In its opinion, this court, in approving the account 
ing and in not allowing interest on the $10,000.00 or 
any part thereof, amended and modified the divorci 
decree by misstating its express terms as follows: 
The divorce decree (Appellant's Brief p. 28) awarded 
the plaintiff $10,000.00 and then continued: 
'' ... which sum shall be paid by the def enda~t 
to the plaintiff out of profits arising from b~st· 
ness interests held by the defendant and which 
profits are actually distributed and received by 
the defendant and shall be immediately due ana 
payable out of the sale of business assets ?f the 
Defendant to third parties and actual receipt b) 
the Defendant of said sale proceeds. Said amount 
shall be payable at the rate of 50 per cent of the 
gross sale r)roceeds until said $10,000.00 has been 
·d · f 11 " pa1 m u ... 
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Thi:,; elearly stated two sources of funds "out of'' which 
the money was to be paid: (1) "out of profits" and (2) 
''out of the sale of business assets." The next sentence 
merely svecified and limited the payments out of sale 
procP<·d,; to 50% of tlll' grm:s sale proceeds. The opinion 
of this court states in the third to the last paragraph 
thereof: 
.. . . That decree specifically provided that 
the amount was to be paid out of profits from 
business interests and profits from salt> of busi-
ness assets ... " 
We respectfully submit that the court's statement of 
what the decree svecifically provided is a complete de-
parture from what it actually said. There is not even 
a word stated about "profits from sale of business 
a:,;sets." The reference is to "gross sale proceeds" from 
the sale of business assets. The word "profits" is used 
in connection with "business interests held by the de-
fendant and which profits are actually distributed and 
received by the Defendant." The court did go on to say 
that interest did not begin to run until plaintiff had a 
right to the money, which implies that she did have a 
right to interest from the date she had a right to the 
money. How can plaintiff determine what interest is 
due on the basis of the so-called accounting submitted 
by defendant (R. 87-8-9, 90-1) which says in effect that 
no profits have been realized and then makes no mention 
of gross sale proceeds but mentions certain small "capi-
tal gains." Plaintiff is not interested whether any sale 
resulted in capital gains or losses. She is entitled to 
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know what the "gross sale proceeds" were from any sal€, 
made, whether reported by defendant in his income tfil 
returns as capital gains or losses or not reported becaus, 
m·ither a <'apital gain or lo:s:s l'l':stilted. We havl• specifie 
a nnmher of tin1es the accounting we are entitled to ir 
order to determine just what interest is due plaintill 
assuming she was not entitled to interest on the $10, 
000.00 award from date of judgment. It has been ordereD 
that we be furnished with such an accounting, but insteao 
of getting the same we have been given further assur 
ances that we would be furnished a further accounting. 
We continue to wait for it - something definitive enougn 
to show not only when and what profits were receiv~ 
''from interests held" but also when and what "gros~ 
sale proceeds" were received from "the sale of businesf 
assets to the defendant to third parties." Certainly, 
plaintiff is entitled to some interest. The amount cannot 
be determined until and unless defendant is required fo 
make and does make a meaningful accounting covering 
both profits and gross sale proceeds. Plaintiff's Re· 
quest and Notice (R. 148-149-150-151) sets forth whal 
we feel she is entitled to. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that even though we believe 
the court's opinion is erroneous in holding that plaintif! 
was not entitled to interest on the $10,000.00 from the 
date of the divorce decree, because it constituted a judg 
ment for a fixed amount and is clearly distinguishable 
under the rulings of this court and numerous other 
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wurts from an alimony or support money award payable 
in monthly or other periodic sums, at least there is some 
basis for the court's ruling on this question. With re-
spect to the other items, however, stated as Points herein, 
we submit that the court's determinations are clearly 
erroneous. Defendant, under the facts and law appli-
cable to this case and the stipulation of his counsel, is 
not entitled to credit for the $350.00 and $1271.14 
amounts on the $10,000.00 he was required to pay to 
plaintiff. The court should determine when and how 
"equities" in the Panguitch home are to be determined 
when it is sold - and at the very least, should determine 
that when it is sold, "equities" are to be determined by 
deducting at that time two items and two only, namely, 
expenses of sale and the balance then remaining due on 
the only mortgage debt, that to Federated, which existed 
when the divorce decree was entered, and that in the 
meantime defendant be required to make all of the pay-
ments thereon in accordance with its terms. The court 
should require a meaningful accounting which would 
enable plaintiff and the court to determine just what 
interest she is entitled to on the $10,000.00 amount 
awarded to her. 
Defendant still owes plaintiff the sum of $4,563.84 
tlireceted by the lower court to be paid to her and we 
urge that thi:,; Jw paid irnmedi,ately and unconditionally, 
1't>g-ardlP:o>8 of the eonrt'8 ruling on this Petition, in order 
to avoid any additional accrual of interest thereon or 
any question with respect thereto. 
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We res1Jeetfully urge that this court grant a reh~ar 
ing and upon such rehearing that it make and enter, 
new and revised opinion in conformity with plaintiff. 
contentions herein. 
Hespedfully submitted 
MATTSSON, JACKSON& 
McIFF 
<JUSTIN & RICHARDS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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APPENDIX 
J1;xeerpt::; from transeript made of argnmenb of Krn 
( 'ltamherlain, eounsel for defendant, and Carvel Matts-
son, eounsel for plaintiff, hefon~ the Utah Suprenw 
Conrt on September 12, 1968 - taken from verbatim 
transaipt of recording made at that time: 
Mr. Chamberlain: 
"Going next to the matter of t>(tnities in tltt> honw, 
the deerPe vrovided that Mr. Crofts would pay a eertain 
figure for alimony, a certain fignre for :rnpvort money, 
and he - that he would pay the mortgage payments on 
the home. Neither one of them happened to be living in 
Panguitch at the time. Later Mr. Crofts returned to 
Panguitch and two of the children came back from Ari-
zona to live with Mr. Crofts in Panguitch. They never 
sold the home. '11hey have not ::;old the home as yet, but 
the two provisions in the Decree are entirely consistent, 
one with the other, that if the home is sold then tht> 
equities will be decided, and I have cited in my brief a 
number of cases which hold that the definition of the 
term equity is the gross value of the sale price less any 
valid indebtednesses against the property, and I think it 
is premature here to determine what the indebtedness 
is going to be when it is sold. We admit that if Mr. 
Crofts stays in the home for the next ten years that 
Mrs. Crofts' equity is going to be considerably larger 
because he will have paid down the principal balance on 
the mortgage materially by the time it is sold. If Mr. 
Crofts stays there until the lawful indebtednesses a~e 
paid off on this property (record turned over at this 
point and a few words were missed) ... provide that 
the property will be held in joint tenaney until it is sold 
as is herei~after provided, so it is entirely - both of 
thest' in·ovisions are entirely consistent Mr. Crofts has 
the obligation of keeping those payments up. 'rhey cer-
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tai1.1l:· di~1't !ntend that .Mr. Crnfts wonkl mature tJ
1
, 
enti~e obhgat10n due on this mortgage and pay it in, 
~ned1atel)-. He was to pay household obligations inclua 
mg the nott:> and mortgag·e and all he has to do witi 
respect to the notl' and mortgage is !Jay it according t• 
its terms and according to those rates .... 
"Now coming to tht> two - the last two rnattern tha 
Mr. Mattsson mentioned, then~ was a home which M
1 
and Mrs. Crofts owned in Salt Lake Cih .... They carn1 
to Salt Lake City and rathPr than rent J{erP they a~smnt11 
the contract on a home. 'l'his again is in the record 
They assumed the contract on a home and when the1 
left Salt Lake City in 1956 they sold that contract to; 
third party. . . . Now with respect to the $350.00 on tbf 
pasture I assuuw - [ assume that - being as Mr1 
Crofts did have horses which were her own property -
race horses - l assume that possibly the $350.00 shoula 
not have been a eredit, and wt->'ll stipulate to that. .. · 
Mr. Carvel Mattsson: 
"Now l understand that frolll what Mr. Chamber 
lain has said here today, which hasn't been adrnittea 
previousl:·, that he will stipnlak now that the $35M 
:-;hould not have been a credit, realized from the sale ol 
the Panguitch vastnre which wa::,; owned jointly h)· tht 
partie8, and he will also 8tipulate that the equities will b~ 
determined wheu the Panguitch home is 8old. It's been 
np in the air - it's been uncertain a::,; to ·when e4mtm 
would lw determined. Of (•ourse, we don't - if onh 
<·o::,;ts and PXJ>en8PS of ::,;ale arP to he deducted, tlH:'ll thal 
-- that point is moot, hut if thP not!' and rnortgagi 
ind<>htt>drn,s:-1 whicl1 Mr. Crofb \\·a~ unh,rt>d to pa~· 1 ~ 
deducted, thPn that point ean lw i!llportant lw<'ause ]I! 
\\·ill Jw n'dncing tlH' nott• a11d 111ortgagP i11d(•)1h•drn·~~ a.-
. " tune goes on. 
-
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